he is back!

big news of the day. maybe the week. may even be the month.

it is no longer a rumuor. nor a hearsay. ezam is back in UMNO! yesterday, he met with PM Abdullah Badawi and presented the membership form for his re-entry into UMNO. that meeting became the main news on tv last nite. TV3 went one step further by interviewing ezam live during Buletin Utama. it has been 'played' as the return of a great leader. and the top leadership as simply being great - willing to forgive and forget for the sake of malay unity.

Last week, when it was still a hearsay, Dato Hishammuddin, UMNO Youth Chief, raised 3 questions on ezam's re-entry into UMNO. nobody bothered to answer him. and in private, he was heard as saying 'over my dead body' when asked of ezam's possible return into UMNO. and now that it is a done deal, we may have a 'funeral' to attend soon.


from: www.bernama.com

May 24, 2008

Hishammuddin Has Three Questions For Party Leadership On Ezam's Entry Into Umno

KLUANG, May 24 (Bernama) -- Umno Youth chief, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein, will pose three questions to the party's leadership if asked about his views on former Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) youth chief Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor's re-entry into Umno.

Hishammuddin said first he will ask what benefit could be achieved by Mohamad Ezam's re-entry into Umno, secondly what was Mohamad Ezam's sincerity in struggling alongside Umno and thirdly what would be Mohamad Ezam's role when he is accepted into Umno.He said although Mohamad Ezam had not made any decision on his re-entry into Umno, he (Hishammuddin) had however readied the three questions for the party leadership's scrutiny.

"In this matter, as Umno Youth chief, I will surely be involved in the talks about Ezam's entry and I am ready to pose the three questions. "I have not had the opportunity to hear for myself his stand as I understand he is out of the country," Hishammuddin said after a meet-the-people function at the Kluang Municipal Hall here.

He said he could not comment on the statement Friday by Pahang Menteri Besar Pahang, Datuk Seri Adnan Yaakob, who welcomed Mohamad Ezam's entry and said the former political secretary of Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim would be an asset to the party."I cannot say yes or no to that statement as long as my three questions are not answered," said Hishammuddin who is also the Education Minister.

Return of the Prodigal Son 2

from: minaq-jinggo.fotopages.com

Return of the Prodigal Son 1

from: minaq-jinggo.fotopages.com

bye bye rocks...

from bigdogdotcom.wordpress.com

THE PULAU BATU PUTEH CASE

A STRATEGIC DISASTER FOR MALAYSIA

by Matthias Chang

Singapore Got The Mansion

Malaysia Got Some Rocks Which Cannot

Be Used To Put Up Even A Kampong Hut

YET RAIS YATIM SAYS,

“We won half and Singapore won half. So I

Say it’s a win-win situation …”

A PICTURE PAINTS A THOUSAND WORDS

AND THE PICTURE OF PULAU BATU PUTEH, MIDDLE ROCKS AND THE SOUTH LEDGE AT THE FRONT PAGE OF STAR NEWSPAPER 24.5.2008 SAYS IT ALL

Summary of Criticism

1) The Legal Team

I am a lawyer and had studied International Law for my Bar Exams in 1975 under the distinguished Professor Ian Brownlie C.B.E. Q.C. member of the English Bar, Chairman of the UN International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international, Distinguished Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford.

Ian Brownlie is the “leader” of the foreign team advising the Singapore government. A brilliant choice!

(a) Foreign Component

The foreign component of the legal team of Malaysia and Singapore are internationally renowned experts in international law and I have no doubts that they discharged their responsibilities admirably. But tactically, the Singapore “foreign component” had a critical advantage in that Ian Brownlie is the Chairman of the UN International Law Commission, and Mr. Alain Pellet is a member and former Chairman of the UN International Law Commission. And Ian Brownlie is not just a brilliant Lawyer (Q.C.), he is also a lawyer who has a profound grasp of geo-political issues.

To dispel any misperceptions and misunderstanding, I am not suggesting that they can influence the ICJ judges, but having served in such a critical position, Ian Brownlie and Alain Pellet have the inside track on the current thinking and or the approach of the ICJ in such disputes. After all, the UN International Law Commission sets the direction and the development of international law. I am therefore not surprised that Singapore went the extra mile to secure their services – a brilliant strategic appointment.

This dispute is not a mere dispute of ownership and sovereignty over some patches of rocks etc. but a strategic battle for control of territorial waters and sea lanes.

(b) Local Component

Both countries for obvious reasons had Ministers to provide the political imput and the critical linkage to their respective Prime Ministers. But, it cannot be said of Abdullah Badawi, our Prime Minister that at all material times, he was “hands-on” in this strategic battle with Singapore – especially when he had conceded so many issues to Singapore (the bridge, airspace, the Iskandar project etc.).

Singapore had a battle-ready Commander-in-Chief, whereas Malaysia’s leader was sleeping and out of touch.

Once again, I must praise Singapore for their brilliant tactical move in having the Chief Justice Mr. Chan Sek Keong as part of the legal team. It reflects the seriousness and total commitment of Singapore to win this case at all costs!

Why was having the Chief Justice as part of the legal team another brilliant strategic appointment?

Simple!

A good advocate does not necessarily make a good judge. But a judge knows the inside workings of the judiciary and how consensus is established amongst judges in arriving at a decision. Therefore, in submitting on behalf of Singapore, the Chief Justice would know how to play to the strength and weaknesses of judges and would be able to offer critical advice to the rest of the team. The Judges of the International Court of Justice must have been impressed by the presence of the Chief Justice. I stand to be corrected, but this could be the first case in which a Chief Justice appeared before the Court. Even if I am wrong on this score, it can be said without fear of contradiction that it would be very rare for a Chief Justice to advance a case for his country.

My US$ Trillion dollar question is – Where was our Chief Justice when it was apparent that Singapore would be using all their “heavy” weapons?

Sad to say, our Judges, including the Chief Justice were all too busy fighting among themselves for the coveted top three jobs in the judiciary to be bothered about this mundane affair. It has no significance to them. I am not surprised that they took the attitude, “this has nothing to do with the judiciary, we judges hear cases, we do not partake in advocacy – even if the country’s strategic interests are at stake.”

We may dislike Singapore and disparage their system of administration, but there is one thing we must admit and learn – when they go to battle, any battle, anyone from the highest to the lowest can be and must be recruited if it serves to ensure victory. Should we be surprised that we keep on losing to Singapore?

The independence of the Malaysian Judiciary is meaningless, if at such critical juncture it is not able to play any role at all. Leadership is sorely lacking!

The Malaysian Bar Council is likewise irrelevant. It is so arrogant and conceited that it cannot see beyond its ugly nose. Like the judiciary, it is a den of vipers and its primary aim (as reflected by the conduct of past and present Chairman) is to promote it’s preferred slate of judicial candidates for higher office.

(c) The Research Component

If the research component is the same as the one that was assembled to do battle with Singapore on the Water Dispute, then I am not at all surprised that we lost this crucial battle to Singapore.

In both cases, Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad was the point man.

The team that advised the then Prime Minister (which is almost the same team as the present one) took the view that Malaysia had a weak case. The Prime Minister was so disappointed in their collective attitude that he instructed me to embark on an independent research and to ensure that no stones were left unturned.

Working close to 18 hours a day for a week, I was able to compiled 14 volumes of critical documents (approximately 1,500 pages) and assembled a team of senior practicing lawyers. The critical document (and our nuclear weapon) was the letter written by none other than Mr. Lee Kuan Yew that no documents, notes, letters, memos etc. exchanged between Malaysia and Singapore will be binding as they were written on a “without prejudice” basis, and that unless and until a formal agreement has been signed by the respective Prime Ministers, nothing is deemed agreed!

When this crucial letter was brought to the attention of the said legal team (which they were not aware) they sheepishly conceded that Singapore had no case against Malaysia!

I do not know whether the team has learnt a lesson from that experience and that for this case, a more thorough effort was mounted. I certainly hope so. But I have my doubts, as Tan Sri Kadir Mohamad is still the point man. In fact, he was appointed by Abdullah Badawi as the “Adviser” and on my retirement as Political Secretary to the then Prime Minister, he moved in and occupied my then office.

2) The Legal Arguments

1) Introduction

For the purposes of this article which is written for the benefit of the public, I do not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis of the judgment of the International Court of Justice. But, I would like to highlight some salient points which will expose the perverse conclusions of the said court that “sovereignty over Pulau Batu Puteh passed to Singapore” as a result of events in the last eighty (80) years.

From the submissions of the respective parties and the judgment of the Court, it is clear that Malaysia and Singapore adopted the common strategy of having all or nothing in determining whether it has sovereignty over:

a) Pedra Branca /Pulau Batu Puteh

b) Middle Rocks

c) South Ledge

as they are “geographically linked”.

Pulau Batu Puteh is a granite island measuring 137 m long, with an average width of 60 m and covering an area of about 8,560 sq m at low tide. It is situated at the eastern entrance of the Straits of Singapore, at the point where the latter open up into the South China Sea. Pulau Batu Puteh is located at 1º 19’ 48” N and 104º 24’ 27” E. It lies approximately 24 nautical miles to the east of Singapore, 7.7 nautical miles to the south of the Malaysian state of Johor and 7.6 nautical miles to the north of the Indonesian island of Bintan.

On the island stands Horsburgh Lighthouse which was erected in the middle of the 19th century.

Middle Rocks and South Ledge are the two maritime features closest to Pulau Batu Puteh. Middle Rock is located 0.6 nautical miles to the south and consists of two clusters of small rocks about 250 m apart that are permanently above water and stand 0.6 to 1.2 m high. South Ledge, at 2.2 nautical miles to the south-south-west of Palau Batu Puteh is a rock formation only visible at low tide.

I trust that you will now agree that Singapore was given “the mansion, while Malaysia was given some rocks which stand only 0.6 to 1.w2 m high”! In short, Malaysia was given crumbs to save face! But our current Foreign Minister says that it is a win-win situation.

How stupid and ridiculous can one get? Freaking a#@hole!

2) Applying Imperialist’s Logic

a) Ownership by Sultanate of Johor

After reviewing the history of the Johor Sultanate and the Dutch and British rivalry for control of South East Asia and the insidious role of the East India Company as an instrument for colonial conquest and occupation, the Court concluded:

“The territorial domain of the sultanate of Johor covered in principle all the islands and islets within the Straits of Singapore, including the island of Pulau Batu Puteh. It finds that this possession of the islands by the Sultanate was never challenged by any other power in the region and can in all circumstances be seen as satisfying the condition of ‘continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty. The Court thus concludes that the Sultanate of Johor had original title to Pulau batu Puteh.”

The Court then reviewed the Imperialist Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 wherein the two colonial powers divided South-East Asia into two separate spheres of influence. The argument by Singapore that by this time the islands in the Straits of Singapore (including Pulau Batu Puteh) were terrae nullius and therefore subject to appropriation through “lawful occupation” was rejected by the Court. The Court concluded that notwithstanding the aforesaid Treaty:

“that as of the time when the British started their preparations for the construction of the lighthouse on Pulau Batu Puteh in 1844, this island was under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Johor.”

b) The 21st September 1953 Letter

On 12th June 1953, the Colonial Secretary of Singapore wrote to the British Adviser to the Sultan of Johor on the status of the island. We know that at the material time, British Advisers had tremendous influence. Why was there such an enquiry when it was very clear that the Sultan had ownership and sovereignty over the island at all material times? The British using this subterfuge must have been preparing the ground for a letter to be issued disclaiming sovereignty over the island. In a letter dated 21st September 1953, the Acting State Secretary replied that “the Johore Government did not claim ownership of Pedra Branca.”

Surely, if the Sultan was indeed disclaiming ownership and sovereignty to the island, any reference would be that of Pulau Batu Puteh as the island was known as such to the Sultanate. The fact that the letter used the Portuguese name of Pedra Branca is evidence that the British contrived to issue this letter. The letter did not say that it was the Sultan that was disclaiming sovereignty. It was the Johor government, which was under British control. Thus we had a situation whereby a British administration in Singapore was writing to another British administration in Johor as to the status of an island belonging to the Sultan and by a stroke of a pen, hijacked the island for their own strategic use.

The Court, applying Imperialist logic dismisses Malaysia’s contention that “the Acting State Secretary was definitely not authorized and did not have the legal capacity to write the 1953 letter, or to renounce, disclaim, or confirm title of any part of the territories of Johor.”

The Court applying bizarre logic then concluded:

“In the light of Johor’s reply, the authorities in Singapore had no reason to doubt that the United Kingdom had sovereignty over the island.”

This is perverse Imperialist logic! Why should the Sultan for no rhyme or reason and out of the blues disclaim or renounce sovereignty over the island? This the Court never explained.

It is abundantly clear that the ICJ used this letter as the main basis (giving its historical context) for their majority decision that sovereignty passed to Singapore. The other secondary reasons (issue of maps) relied on by the Court which of itself are never ever sufficient and or conclusive to support a claim for sovereignty as they can refuted by other countervailing documents.

I am fortified in my view as one of the judges, though agreeing with the majority opinion that Singapore has sovereignty over the island observed that the Court failed to appreciate impact and consequences that at the material time when the letter of 1953 was issued, the Sultan of Johor was under the “colonial control” of the British Colonial administration. I quote:

“While relations between sovereign colonial Powers fell within the ambit of international law, it is difficult to argue that dealings between the United kingdom and the Sultanate of Johor were based on relations between sovereign, equal subjects of international law. Thus, the sovereignty acknowledged to indigenous authorities was inoperative vis-à-vis colonial Powers, the authorities’ sole obligation being to submit to the will of the powers. Under these circumstances, the Sultan of Johor could not broach the slightest opposition to a decision by the British.”

Judge Parra-Aranguren was more devastating in his dissenting opinion and considered that “the findings made by the Court in the judgment demonstrate that judicial reason can always be found to support any conclusion.”

This is indeed a grievous indictment as to the integrity of the judgment and the judges that formed the majority opinion. I believe that this may be the first time that a fellow judge has questioned in such a dramatic way the integrity of the judgment of his fellow judges.

I wonder whether the Malaysian Bar and its Chairman, Ambiga has the courage of its convictions to expose this perverse judgment. In his dissenting judgment, Justice Parra-Aranguren supported my contention that the Court applied imperialist logic with regard to the effect and implications of the 21st September 1953 letter.

Additionally, the said judge exposed the fact that the conclusions offered by the majority opinion contradicts and are in conflict with their own findings of fact. For example, the bulk of activities of alleged “Singapore control” over the island was post 1953 and that both parties had agreed and the Court found that 1980 was the critical date for the purposes of the dispute as to sovereignty over the island.

Therefore, Singapore was only “actively involved” in the island for about 20 odd years. Yet, in an earlier decision in 2002, the Court handed down a judgment that a period of 20 years of activity is “far too short” a period to establish sovereignty [case: Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, ICJ Reports 2002, page 352]

Such activities cannot in law undermine historical title, which title was acknowledged as having being with the Sultan of Johor. There is the added confusion in the said judgment [para 222] in that the Court expressly acknowledges that “ownership is in principle distinct from sovereignty.”

This is where I believe the Malaysian team screwed up big time. The judge observed that at all material times, the Sultanate of Johor used the term “ownership” and not “sovereignty”.

The judge also observed that there have been a few instances where in international litigation, “ownership” over territory has sometimes been used as “equivalent to sovereignty”. Be that as it may, the fact remains, that “ownership” and “sovereignty” are two distinct and separate concepts!

Conclusions

This article written for the public cannot encompass the entire legal arguments in support of my contention that the judgment of the ICJ is perverse.

There are urgent lessons to be learnt from this case. But I am not hopeful that Malaysia will more vigilant in protecting itself from predator states like Singapore from hijacking our lands.

This case seems to rest on the same principles in which Israel was founded. The myth and propaganda [specifically by Golda Meir] for the creation of Israel in Palestine was that Palestine was a land without any people, and that the Jews were people without a land.

Therefore, it was right and proper to take the land away from the Palestinians.

Singapore do not have enough land for its people. It has attempted to reclaim land even on the island of Pulau Batu Puteh, besides the use of the strategic lighthouse. Singapore claims that Johor has no sovereignty over the island. Therefore, the island belongs to Singapore.

This is Zionist fascist logic.

Matthias Chang

24th May 2008

Kuala Lumpur

a roller-coaster ride...

from http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/

Muhyiddin reveals his hand, he wants Pak Lah to go

KUALA LUMPUR, May 25 — The charade is over. Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin wants Abdullah to step aside. At least that was the sting of the words he used when speaking to Federal Territory party members yesterday. "Pak Lah is my friend, but can he manage the current situation? He's a good man, but the situation has changed. I am being sincere," said the Umno vice-president, who has been ambivalent at best since Election 2008 on the prospect of Abdullah remaining in power.

His Cabinet colleagues have expected this day to come soon, noting that his body language and comments during meetings have been that of someone who was not on the same page with the prime minister. Muhyiddin was supposed to speak to the FT politicians about code of ethics but instead launched into an analysis of Abdullah's leadership and the challenging political landscape.

In his speech to the FT politicians, he sketched the current scenario in the country, noting that Umno and Barisan fared badly in the polls and lost the support of the young. The only consolation was that the BN snared 140 seats, eight short of its customary two-third majority in Parliament. He quoted liberally from Dr Mahathir’s criticism of Abdullah, saying that there must be drastic action in the party and leadership.

"We need to change, so that we don't go down and down. I'm quoting Dr M because he is a veteran leader who is worried that the Malays will lose power," he said, adding that neither Abdullah nor Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak nor supreme council members have framed the current political situation in these stark terms.

To manage this situation, Umno must be strong, he said.

"We cannot have a weak leader managing challenging circumstances. I am not saying this about present leadership, you can decide for yourself," he said.

Muhyiddin then went on to give instances of weak leadership. He said that he brought to Abdullah’s attention the need for Sabah and Sarawak to have adequate representation in the Cabinet.

"But now look at situation," he said, referring to disappointment by Sabah BN over the allocation of only three ministerial positions to the state.

Then Muhyiddin turned to the standoff over the appointment of the menteris besar of Perlis and Terengganu with the Malay Rulers which eventually resulted in Abdullah backing down.
"Why? Because of weak leadership. You say you're strong, but you're weak. I am going to speak as I'm a vice-president. Many people are still in denial," he said.

By taking this position, Muhyiddin is clearly throwing his name forward to party members as someone who can be considered for either the party president or deputy president at the Umno elections in December. Supporters of Datuk Seri Najib and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah said that intermediaries said to be acting on behalf of the Minister of International Trade and Industry has reached out to them recently over the possibility of forming a tag team for the elections.

But they did not get any joy from either camp. Najib remains loyal to Abdullah while Tengku Razaleigh is content to push for his reform agenda on his own steam. Still, Muhyiddin has other options. He can lead the opposition against Abdullah and offer himself as the next party president.
Alternatively, he can quit Cabinet, the government and offer to return only after Abdullah has relinquished power.

For Abdullah, the signs are clear. This could be the beginning of a revolt against his leadership by some power brokers in Umno. Since Election 2008, he has had to fend off calls for his resignation. But none of these critics were from the supreme council, the party’s highest decision-making body.
Muhyiddin’s comments yesterday could embolden other senior party officials to come forward and speak out against the current leadership and give strength to Dr Mahathir’s campaign to oust Abdullah.

Abdullah has only two choices: use all the powers of incumbency and fight like never before to stay in office. Or set an earlier date for the transition of power to Najib.


my thoughts:

the week started off stormy.

on monday, Tun M announced his resignation from UMNO. i was shocked - well, everybody was shocked. i got the news at about 1pm. from then onwards, countless smses and phone calls were made. getting advice. exchanging thoughts. by 9pm, i decided to quit as well.

since monday, everybody who is somebody rallied behind PM Abdullah Badawi. pledging their loyalty and support. war of words once again erupted. words like 'sandiwara' and 'duri dalam daging' were thrown towards Tun M - which Tun M found 'mengelikan hati'.

on tuesday, i attended the press conference called by Dato Mukhriz. he basically re-iterated his call for PM Abdullah Badawi to step down in the shortest time period. when? - one reporter asked. preferably july, before the start of the annual UMNO branch meeting. as of now, he remains in UMNO. but he reserved the right to change his stance if nothing happens. one thing i dont understand is that, he would be referred to UMNO's Management Committee. even Pemuda UMNO Perak has called for Dato Mukhriz to be sacked. when his letter asking PM Abdullah Badawi to step down became public, no action was taken. so why now? after all, at the PC, he only said the same thing - PM Abdullah Badawi must step down. plus, please show me which rule did he break that justify a sacking?!

on wednesday nite, someone related a story to me. apparently, after Tun M resigned from UMNO, there were talks that members of an UMNO branch in Selangor would follow suit and shut down their branch. to cut a long story short, the affected Divisonal Head received a call from numero uno himself that day about the matter. The Divisional Head later said that it was the first time he got a call from numero uno. so is that a sign of panic?

i find these comments from Muhyiddin very refreshing. very interesting. and very damaging to PM Abdullah Badawi. i wonder why the mainstream media did not carry it in whole. maybe they did not have enough space. let's not blame them. thanks to my friend Doc Siva, who called to tell me about this article in Malaysian Insider. otherwise, i would have missed it altogether, like the rest of the population.

it has been a roller-coaster ride. but this is indeed a great end to the week.

Funny Haha or Funny Hahahahaha.....

from www.chedet.com

Saya telah ikuti laporan berkenaan keputusan saya keluar dari UMNO yang disiarkan RTM 1, 8 malam, 19 hb Mei. Komen oleh dua pemimpin UMNO amat menggelikan hati saya.

Tun Musa Hitam dakwa saya adalah ‘duri dalam daging yang sekarang sudah dikeluarkan.’

Tun, apakah Tun lupa Tun jadi duri dalam daging UMNO tahun 1986 - 87 dahulu? Semasa Tun jadi Timbalan Perdana Menteri [di lantik oleh saya]. Tun telah letak jawatan Timbalan Perdana Menteri dan Timbalan Presiden UMNO kerana hendak saya berhenti daripada jadi Perdana Menteri dan diganti oleh Tun. Atas rayuan ahli Majlis Tertinggi, Tun kembali sebagai Timbalan Presiden UMNO. Rupa-rupanya Tun masih punyai niat untuk jatuhkan saya.

Oleh itu Tun menghasut Tengku Razaleigh yang menjadi musuh ketat Tun supaya lawan saya. Demikianlah bencinya Tun kepada saya sehingga sanggup terima musuh ketat Tun bertanding Presiden, dan Tun jadi Timbalannya; Tun sebelum itu rayu supaya saya sokong Tun untuk rebut jawatan Timbalan Presiden dalam pertandingan lawan Tengku Razaleigh.

Akhirnya pecahlah UMNO dan muncullah parti serpihan Semangat 46. Tetapi dengan bijaknya Tun tidak menyertainya. Tun selamat dan dilantik oleh saya sebagai perutusan bertaraf Menteri ke Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu. Tengku Razaleigh terkeluar daripada UMNO Baru dan menjadi mangsa perancangan Tun. Syabas Tun. Saya tak tahu sekarang Tun ahli UMNO atau tidak.

Satu lagi pemimpin UMNO ialah Shahrir Samad yang lupa bagaimana dia keluar UMNO, jadi calon bebas dan lawan dengan UMNO, dalam Pilihanraya Kecil dengan simbol kunci.

Siapakah kamu yang nak kritik tindakan saya? Jika tidak kerana kakak Tun Musa sebagai Ketua Wanita Johor Bahru datang pagi-pagi ke rumah saya untuk merayu supaya Dato dibenar kembali ke pangkuan UMNO, Dato akan jadi duri dalam daging UMNO lebih lama. Walaupun Dato maki hamun saya semasa pilihanraya kecil saya bersetuju Dato masuk balik UMNO.

Saya ucap tahniah kerana Dato dapat sekali lagi jadi Menteri. Jagalah harga barang baik-baik. Tak usahlah komen tentang diri saya.

Tepuk dulang paku serpih.
Katakan orang awak yang lebih.

Official Statement by Dato' Mukhriz

20 MEI 2008

YB DATO’ MUKHRIZ MAHATHIR
AHLI PARLIMEN JERLUN
EXCO PERGERAKAN PEMUDA UMNO MALAYSIA

Merujuk kepada tindakan ayahanda saya, YABhg Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad di Alor Setar, Kedah semalam, yang mengumumkan keluar dari parti sehinggalah YAB Dato’ Seri Abdulah Hj Ahmad Badawi meletak jawatan sebagai Perdana Menteri, Presiden UMNO dan Pengerusi Barisan Nasional, saya dengan ini membuat kenyataan seperti berikut:

1. Saya amat faham dan bersetuju bahawa tindakan ayahanda saya adalah kerana sayangnya beliau kepada UMNO. Saya juga percaya bahawa bagi mencapai matlamat tindakan tersebut, terdapat lebih dari satu cara perlaksanaanya. Maka dengan itu, saya mengumumkan bahawa saya TIDAK AKAN MELETAKKAN JAWATAN DI DALAM UMNO,SEBAGAI AHLI PARLIMEN JERLUN MAHUPUN SEBAGAI AHLI UMNO. SAYA AKAN TETAP SETIA SEBAGAI AHLI UMNO DAN AKAN MENJADI SUARA YANG LANTANG MENEGUR KEPINCANGAN KEPIMPINAN PARTI;

2. Seterusnya, saya serta rakan-rakan yang sependirian dengan saya dengan ini MENDESAK SEKERAS-KERASNYA AGAR YAB DATO’ SERI ABDULLAH HJ AHMAD BADAWI MELETAKKAN JAWATAN SEBAGAI PERDANA MENTERI MALAYSIA, PRESIDEN UMNO DAN PENGERUSI BARISAN NASIONAL DENGAN SEGERA;

3. Kami juga mendesak agar Majlis Tertinggi UMNO MEMBUKA SELUAS-LUASNYA SEGALA RUANG DEMOKRASI PARTI YANG TERMAKTUB DI DALAM PERLEMBAGAAN PARTI yakni dalam bentuk pemansuhan sistem kuota, membenarkan Mesyuarat Agung Luar Biasa diadakan, tidak menghalang ahli-ahli UMNO untuk mengadakan majlis bersama pemimpin atau tokoh Melayu, dan tidak mengeluarkan sebarang bentuk arahan, kekangan atau larangan yang menafikan prinsip-prinsip demokrasi dalam parti; dan

4. Selanjutnya, kami MENGGESA AHLI UMNO KHUSUSNYA DAN RAKYAT MALAYSIA AMNYA, menyuarakan bantahan mereka terhadap kepimpinan YAB Dato’ Seri Abdullah Hj Ahmad Badawi secara terbuka dan lantang melalui surat peribadi, sms, surat kepada media serta melalui sidang-sidang media, bagi MEMBERI TEKANAN AGAR YAB DATO’ SERI SEGERA MELETAKKAN JAWATAN SEBAGAI PERDANA MENTERI, PRESIDEN UMNO DAN PENGERUSI BARISAN NASIONAL.

Ini adalah pendirian saya pada waktu ini. Saya tidak akan teragak-agak untuk mengubah pendirian saya ini sekiranya keadaan tidak beransur pulih.

Sekian.

Official Statement by Tun M

Hari ini, Mei 19, 2008 saya mengumumkan keputusan saya untuk keluar daripada UMNO. Isteri saya turut bersama.

Keputusan ini dibuat kerana UMNO yang ada sekarang bukan lagi UMNO yang ditubuh 62 tahun dahulu yang berjuang untuk bangsa Melayu, Agama Islam dan Negara Malaysia (Malaya); UMNO yang menggagalkan Malayan Union, memperjuangkan kemerdekaan Malaya dan Malaysia dan membangunkan Malaysia sehingga menjadi Negara yang termaju di antara Negara membangun di dunia.

UMNO yang ada sekarang hanya wujud untuk menyokong Dato Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, keluarganya dan tindakan serta dasar yang tidak secocok dengan kepentingan bangsa, agama dan negara.

Kepimpinan Dato Seri Abdullah jelas membawa kekalahan dan bencana kepada Barisan Nasional, UMNO, MCA, MIC, Gerakan dan PPP. Kemenangan UMNO di Sabah dan BN di Sarawak bukan kerana kepimpinan Dato Seri Abdullah.

Saya akan jelas satu persatu dasar-dasar dan tindakan Dato Seri Abdullah yang menjadikan Kerajaan pimpinannya dan parti BN dibenci oleh ahli-ahli parti komponen sendiri.

Walaupun sebelum perisytiharan ini saya adalah ahli UMNO tetapi sebenarnya selepas saya letak jawatan sebagai Perdana Menteri saya tidak dilayan sebagai ahli UMNO.

Saya tidak dibenarkan berjumpa ahli UMNO dan ahli UMNO tidak dibenarkan hadir apa-apa perhimpunan di mana saya dijemput sebagai jurucakap atau penyampai ucapan.

Menteri-Menteri yang dahulu berada dalam Kabinet saya tidak dibenarkan atau tidak berani atau tidak mahu jumpa saya lagi.

Jemputan oleh UMNO dan bukan UMNO kepada saya diarah ditarik balik oleh Mneteri Besar dan Polis.

Ramai pemimpin UMNO melepaskan kata-kata kesat kepada saya dan ada yang menyuruh saya keluar daripada UMNO walaupun mereka baru sahaja masuk UMNO. Tidak ada pemimpin UMNO yang pertahankan saya secara terbuka.

Wakil ke Perhimpunan Agong tidak dibenarkan menyuara pendapat mereka. Mulut semua orang ditutup.

Yang didengar hanyalah media arus perdana yang memuji Dato Seri Abdullah sehingga dia percaya dia begitu popular dan akan sapu bersih parti lawan dalam pilihanraya umum ke-12.

Hasilnya ialah kekalahan yang teruk bagi Barisan Nasional. Malangnya mesej yang hendak disampaikan oleh pengundi dan penyokong BN tidak dapat difahami oleh Dato Seri Abdullah.

Dia masih berkata dia menang. Ini sukar diterima oleh orang Kedah, orang Pulau Pinang, orang Perak, Selangor dan Wilayah Persekutuan.

Oleh kerana Dato Seri Abdullah buta mata dan pekak telinga dan tidak faham mesej ahli BN, oleh kerana ahli UMNO pun turut bersama, oleh kerana proses demokrasi tidak berjalan, oleh kerana UMNO yang ada sekarang bukan lagi UMNO yang ditubuhkan 62 tahun dahulu, saya berpendapat penyertaan saya sebagai ahli UMNO tidak bermakna dan tidak berguna lagi.

Justeru itu saya ingin umumkan bahawa saya sudah keluar daripada UMNO.

Saya ingin tegaskan bahawa saya bebas dan tidak menyokong mana-mana parti lawan.

Saya akan pohon untuk masuk UMNO apabila Dato Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi sudah berhenti daripada menjadi Presiden UMNO, Pengerusi BN dan Perdana Menteri Malaysia.

Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad (bekas ahli UMNO No 1)
Dr Siti Hasmah binti Mohd Ali (bekas ahli UMNO No 2)

Resignation Letter

this is my resignation letter as an UMNO member. it was not an easy decision. but it is the only right one for me to make. Tun M shall not walk alone.

two generations of my family served UMNO. my grandfather and father were wakil rakyats representing UMNO. i joined UMNO so that i could continue their work. i joined UMNO so that i could repay my debts to UMNO - if i ever could. help my fellow malays. be part of nation building.

well, i will continue doing my part for the malays and the country. just that, it would not be within UMNO - for the time being. I still believe UMNO is the only party for the malays. it is an institution that must be protected. but the current leadership has failed to make UMNO a strong party. the current leadership has failed to listen. there must be accountability. lead by example. but do not lead us to the grave.

i do not hold any position in UMNO. so i do not lose anything.

UMNO will always be with me.


19 Mei 2008

Setiausaha
Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO
Bahagian Kemaman
Terengganu Darul Iman


Tuan

Keahlian UMNO: 02851601

Adalah dengan hormatnya saya merujuk kepada perkara di atas.

Saya dengan berat hati meletakkan keahlian saya sebagai ahli UMNO Cawangan Chukai, Bahagian Kemaman, Terengganu Darul Iman.

Saya berdoa UMNO akan kembali menjiwai pemikiran serta aspirasi bangsa Melayu.

Sekian. Wassalam.


Wan Azrain Adnan

Berita Terkini

Saya menerima sms ini dari seorang kenalan pada pukul 1.35 am tadi. Beliau adalah seorang yang berjawatan di dalam pergerakan pemuda UMNO Selangor. Berikut adalah sms penuh beliau:

Berita Terkini - Barisan Rakyat Pimpinan Pak Lah.

Presiden: Pak Lah
Timbalan Presiden: TS Mohamad Taib
S/U Agung: Tengku Adnan
Bendahari: Dato Azim
Ketua Penerangan: Dato Shabery Cheek
Naib Presiden: Dato Khalid Nordin
Dato Adnan Yaakob
TS Rahim Tamby chik

Kearah UMNO perkasa, mesra, prihatin, gemilang & terbilang. Misi nasional untuk rakyat Malaysia. Kembalikan UMNO ke perjuangan asal. Tradisi membela rakyat.

komen saya:

saya tidak setuju. ini bukanlah barisan kepimpinan yang boleh menjayakan UMNO.

Malaysian Idol

Sunday Star: May 11, 2008

He’s the best

READING Huzir Sulaiman’s comments on the former prime minister (Mahathir vs the Malay Rulers, Wide Angle, StarMag May 4) made me sick.

Whatever you may say about Tun (Dr Mahathir Mohamad), it doesn’t make him less of a man than he is. He is the best Prime Minister Malaysia ever had. Others pale in comparison with him in every way.

In his time, he built Malaysia to what the country is today. He has touched so many lives. He has improved the quality of life of millions, including your parents.

He has helped to produce so many middle-class families, especially in the Malay community, including thousands of lawyers, doctors, engineers and other professionals.

He has made our lives so much easier that now, when things are a bit rough, we can only whine and complain.

The Malays held their heads higher during his time. He doesn’t believe in Western expertise. He believes in us, the Malays, and our ability to head everything.

He has put the royals in their right place and maintained a good lifestyle for them because Malaysia could afford it during his time.

He delivered what he promised. The Opposition was nothing during his time. Now, it seems the Malays are doing everything wrong.

Maybe Huzir is not aware of all this because, in his time, when he wanted to go to school, his mother dropped him off; when he wants take a drive, he can take the highway; when he wants to buy things, he goes to the hypermarket.

We, in our time, had to walk to school, take a rickety bus to town, buy groceries from an old Chinese shop in the kampung. In the evenings, we had to help our mothers in the padi field, tap rubber, jual kuih, etc.

We appreciated the good deeds of others instead of highlighting their faults.

Huzir, ask yourself what have you done for the people, for the country. How many people’s lives have you personally touched?

Where were you when there was no water in our kampung, when the padi field did not yield a good harvest, when our children needed scholarships?

Have you ever been to a kampung, helped the needy, tasted what it is like to work in the padi field or vegetable plot, or tap rubber?

Jangan nak berlagak pandai. Just look deeper in your roots, then you will see the greatness that he has done rather than being preoccupied with finding his faults.

Taoyebah Abd Aziz

Ruling The Rulers - Part III

Sunday Star: May 4, 2008

Mahathir vs the Malay Rulers

WIDE ANGLE
By HUZIR SULAIMAN

In the concluding instalment of the three-part series, Ruling the Rulers, our columnist looks at the outcome of Dr Mahathir’s 1983 standoff with the Sultans.

BY October 1983, Malaysians were becoming aware that a constitutional crisis was in full swing. The Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1983 had been passed by both houses of Parliament, but the King, under pressure from his fellow rulers, was refusing to give his Royal Assent to it.

The bill would remove the need for the King to assent to legislation, and would similarly do away with the need for Sultans to assent to State laws. It would also take away the King's power to declare an Emergency and give it to the Prime Minister.

The Rulers publicly rejected these amendments after a meeting in Selangor on Nov 20, 1983. When the public became aware that a storm was brewing, Dr Mahathir’s administration initiated a propaganda war to put pressure on the Rulers.

There took place a “series of illegal public rallies held by Umno in Alor Star, Bagan Datoh, Seremban, Batu Pahat, Malacca, for the Prime Minister with reports of officially inflated crowd figures?.” as Lim Kit Siang would later describe them in the Dewan Rakyat.

These rallies, staged in order to generate sympathy for the Government’s cause, were illegal in the sense that police permits were neither sought nor granted.

Whether or not the crowd figures were inflated by the Umno-aligned media – it is true that they generally reported these events in positive terms – it is clear that the 1983 rallies were exciting evenings, with republican sentiments on everyone’s minds, if not exactly on their lips. One of the most arresting images in Rais Yatim’s Faces in the Corridor of Power is a photograph of two youths at one such rally. They are wearing T-shirts bearing Dr Mahathir’s picture and the words “DAULAT RAKYAT”.

Although the Prime Minister denied wanting to abolish the monarchy, at these rallies “the historical moment of unfolding Malay nationalism was relived as a continuing battle of Malay popular sovereignty against royal hegemony,” as Khoo Boo Teik writes in Paradoxes of Mahathirism.

At a rally in Alor Star on Nov 26, Dr Mahathir declared that “It was the rakyat who had protested against the Malayan Union after the Second World War; it was the rakyat who wanted a democratic system that would enable them to choose their own leaders. It was always the people who had fought for their destiny.”

At the largest rally, in Batu Pahat, Dr Mahathir told the crowds, in a thinly veiled dig at hereditary rulers, “We weren’t born Ministers ? We’re up here because we were chosen by all of you.”

The propaganda war continued, with tales of royal extravagance and impropriety emerging. The Government leaked the fact that they were compiling dossiers on the Sultans. RTM announced they were preparing a year-long TV series on the Rulers and the Constitution.

Yet pro-royal rallies took place too – especially in Kelantan and Terengganu, where Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah was rumoured to be responsible for them – and they drew large crowds, although they went unreported by the media.

Upping the ante, the Umno Youth executive council called for the Government to gazette the Constitution (Amendment) Bill without waiting for the King's assent, effectively daring the Rulers to challenge it in court. Dr Mahathir did not immediately adopt this strategy, but held this “nuclear option” in reserve while behind-the-scenes negotiations continued with the Rulers.

Public opinion was divided over the issue. Rural Malays tended to support the Rulers; urban Malays, while not uncritical of Mahathir’s strategies and motives, were more ready to accept egalitarian ideas.

As for the Chinese community, R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy note in Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir that “One might have expected that, since the rulers and the Agung were symbols of ‘Malayness’ the Chinese would feel little loyalty to them. Paradoxically, they were quite pro-royalty, because they did not really trust Malay politicians. Indeed, they viewed the Agung and the rulers as protectors of their vital interests.”

There seemed to be no way out of the impasse except by compromise – which is what happened. The Rulers agreed to the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill 1983 on the condition that many of its provisions were modified or repealed immediately with the introduction of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1984.

The new bill, passed in January 1984, meant that the King could now only delay a piece of non-money legislation for a month. It then had to be sent back to Parliament with his objections. If the King still opposed it in the form in which Parliament then passed it, he could only delay it for another month before it was gazetted as law.

The King could therefore only delay legislation for up to two months before it became the law of the land.

But this principle was no longer extended to the State level: Sultans still needed to assent to State bills before they became law, which was an important symbolic victory. Most importantly for those who feared Dr Mahathir’s supposed plan to concentrate power in his own hands, the bill removed the proposed ability of the Prime Minister to declare an Emergency by himself, and restored it to the King.

Nonetheless, Dr Mahathir saw himself as having won, declaring at a victory rally in Malacca that the feudal system had ended. He had brought his theatrical, confrontational, unapologetically antagonistic style to a high-stakes arena and had, by some accounts at least, triumphed over the Malay Rulers.

He quickly moved to consolidate his gains. Stories had been circulating that the head of the army, Jen Tan Sri Mohd Zain Hashim, was opposed to Mahathir’s approach and believed the armed force’s loyalty lay with the Rulers. Mohd Zain took early retirement. This was followed by a reorganisation of the army and some 500 other early retirements and dismissals.

When the independent-minded Sultan of Johor took over as Yang di-Pertuan Agong in 1984, some feared (and some hoped) that royal activism would reassert itself.

As Roger Kershaw writes in Monarchy In South-East Asia: Faces of Tradition in Transition, “From the beginning, the Agong had made no secret of his contempt for Mahathir on the grounds of his mixed blood, calling him, to his face, ‘Mamak’ (a derogatory nickname for those of Indian Muslim ancestry). [?] But Dr Mahathir had proved more than a match for this difficult sovereign. Having got the measure of the King’s essential vanity and exhibitionism, he prudently pandered to it, even to the extent of placing a more convenient Royal Malaysian Airforce helicopter at his permanent disposal?.”

Through this and other measures, Dr Mahathir maintained good relations with the new King, enlisting him in his 1987 move against the judiciary, the effects of which are still felt today.

The Prime Minister’s campaign continued. He silenced the Rulers over the issue of the 1987 ISA detentions; staged a hostile debate on the monarchy in the 1990 Umno general assembly after the loss of Kelantan to PAS; removed the Rulers’ immunity to prosecution following the constitutional crisis of 1992-93; stripped away their flights, outriders, and special hospital wards; and in 1994, with little opposition, finally removed the need to obtain the Rulers’ assent for State laws.

Looking back, we can see how the bars of the yellow silk cage began to go up in 1983, closing in year after year.

Should we find it surprising, then, that after 25 years the tigers within should want to break free? Can we not understand that the Rulers might want to regain what has been lost?

And here is the hardest question of all: without giving up our democratic ideals, in a cynical and disloyal age, can we find a way to let our Rulers rule?

Huzir Sulaiman writes for theatre, film, television, and newspapers.

Ruling the Rulers - Part II

Sunday Star: April 20, 2008

The Mahathir years

WIDE ANGLE
By HUZIR SULAIMAN

In the second segment of Ruling the Rulers, an analysis of the challenges faced by the Malay Rulers over the years, Wide Angle examines the post-Merdeka period.

THE 1960s, although a tumultuous decade for many other reasons, was relatively quiet in terms of intervention by the Malay Rulers in matters of administration and politics.

The relationship between the Sultans and the Alliance Government was still benefiting from the effort both parties had been obliged to make to find common ground in the run-up to their negotiations with the British in 1956.

(Eventually, the Rulers had been persuaded to drop their opposition to the granting of citizenship to non-Malays born in Malaya, a provision insisted on by the British, championed, naturally, by the MIC and MCA, and accepted by Umno only with a certain amount of trauma.)

But the honeymoon period of the new constitutional monarchy couldn’t last forever.

By 1981, when Dr Mahathir Mohamad succeeded Hussein Onn as Prime Minister of Malaysia, the country was in the giddy throes of a surge in royal activism.

The period from 1977 to 1983 saw several Sultans make their presence felt in the political arena to a far greater degree than had been previously seen.

The close of Hussein Onn’s premiership saw conflicts between several Sultans and Mentris Besar erupt into the open.

In 1977, the Sultan of Kelantan attempted to intervene in a crisis caused by the deteriorating relations between PAS and Umno (then in a short-lived alliance).

The Sultan attempted to postpone the dissolution of the State Assembly following a vote of no confidence in the Mentri Besar, in order that a replacement MB could be found from PAS without elections being called.

Unrest followed, which was ample pretext for the Federal Government to declare a State of Emergency in Kelantan. In the subsequent State elections, Umno came to power, a situation that the Sultan had been trying to avoid.

Things were heating up elsewhere, too. In 1977 the Sultan of Perak ostracised his Mentri Besar to the point that he was forced to resign. In 1978, the Sultan of Pahang rejected the Umno nominee for MB and, in 1981, the Sultan of Johor forced his MB to resign after 14 years in office.

We cannot know with any certainty what the new Prime Minister’s attitudes were towards the Malay Rulers when he assumed office in 1981 in the midst of this burgeoning atmosphere of royal assertiveness.

However, in Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad, Khoo Boo Teik argues that “Mahathir was not necessarily an out and out ‘anti-royalist’. He found heroes in strong modernising sovereigns such as Peter the Great and the Meiji Emperor but his attitude towards the Malay royalty was less admiring.”

Khoo notes that “Mahathir’s disdain for the Malay rulers had ? been expressed in oblique criticism before.

“C.H.E. Det (Mahathir’s pen name in the late 1940s) had cast the 1949 conflict between the Malay royalty and the nascent Umno leadership as a conflict between ‘rulers and rakyats’. Then, C.H.E. Det stood with those who thought that the rulers had either to yield to the wishes of Umno and its supporters or to forfeit the loyalty of the Malays.”

What is almost certain is that Dr Mahathir would have been aware that the independent-minded Sultans of Perak and Johor were the two most likely candidates to become the next Agong in 1984.

Indeed, their Highnesses were shortly to demonstrate their autonomy in ways that led to a measure of public distress.

In 1982, the Sultan of Perak, in his capacity as Head of Religion in his State, looked at the two permissible methods used to calculate the timing of Hari Raya Puasa, and chose the one different from that used in the rest of the country.

That year the fasting month ended a day earlier in Perak, disrupting travel plans and inadvertently making it a rather stressful holiday for the Malay community.

The following year, both the Sultans of Perak and Johor used the alternate method, and their two States celebrated Hari Raya a day earlier than the rest of Malaysia.

Some commentators have suggested that the distress of the “variant Hari Raya” prompted Dr Mahathir’s subsequent desire to concentrate administrative power in the Federal Government.

But R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, in Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, citing interviews with Umno ministers, suggest that what became known as the 1983 constitutional crisis “was precipitated by reports, received by Mahathir, that the Sultan of Johor stated at a gathering that when he was elected Agong he would unilaterally declare a state of emergency, and with the aid of the army, throw out all the politicians.

“Compounding this were stories that the Sultan was close to certain key military men, and that the army chief, General Tan Sri Mohd Zain Hashim, had criticised Mahathir’s approach and had questioned where the army’s loyalty rested.”

Whatever the case may be, on Aug 1, the Government brought the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1983 before both houses of Parliament, and it was quickly passed.

The bill put forward 22 amendments to the Federal Constitution, including three very significant changes to the position of the Malay Rulers.

First, it removed the need for the Agong to give his Royal Assent to a piece of legislation before it could be gazetted as law. Instead, it stipulated that if the Agong did not give his Assent within 15 days, he was deemed to have done so, and the law could come into effect.

Second, it introduced parallel provisions removing the need for a Sultan to give his Assent to State laws.

Third, it transferred the power to declare an Emergency from the Agong (who was, in any case, supposed to act on the advice of Cabinet in this regard) directly to the Prime Minister, who was not obliged to act on anyone’s advice.

The Prime Minister’s Department had ordered a press blackout on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1983 and, so, while the fact of the bill’s passing was mentioned, its significance was downplayed, and the debate – including an impassioned speech in opposition to it by DAP’s Lim Kit Siang – did not appear in local media.

For the following two months, nothing appeared. But a right royal storm was brewing.

Immediately, the liberal intelligentsia opposed the provision that allowed the Prime Minister to unilaterally declare an Emergency.

On Aug 2, 1983, Aliran issued a statement condemning the Bill, claiming the proposed amendment “opens the way to political abuse. For the Prime Minister is, in the ultimate analysis, a political personality very much involved in the conflicts and compromises of party politics. There is no constitutional mechanism for ensuring that he will not use his emergency powers against his political foes from any quarter.

“It is simply not possible to prevent an ambitious Prime Minister in the future from emerging as a ‘supremo’ after the proclamation of an emergency.”

But, under the strict press blackout, it was not reported.

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the public, the Agong, under pressure from his fellow Rulers, refused to give his Assent to the Bill.

The Rulers maintained that the Bill contravened Article 38(4) of the Constitution, which stated that “No law directly affecting the privileges, position, honours or dignities of the Rulers shall be passed without the consent of the Conference of Rulers.”

The Rulers had also come to understand the full legal implications of removing the need for Royal Assent to legislation. It meant that if Parliament voted to abolish the monarchy, the Rulers would be powerless to stop them.

Tensions continued to build behind the scenes. It was only in October, when Senu Abdul Rahman circulated a letter condemning the amendments, followed by Tunku Abdul Rahman defying the gag order by writing about them in the pages of this newspaper, that Malaysians woke up to the crisis.

There were also disagreements within Umno; as Gordon P. Means notes in Malaysian Politics: the Second Generation, “? many in the ruling coalition were distressed by the contents of the amendments and the confrontational style of Dr Mahathir towards the Malay Rulers.”

Some establishment figures believed the Prime Minister had far-reaching aims. In a 1988 interview transcribed in K. Das & The Tunku Tapes, Tunku Abdul Rahman and the veteran journalist discuss the constitutional crisis.

If one can look past the bitchy, surat layang (poison pen letter) tone of their stories about Dr Mahathir’s children, one can get a snapshot of the groundswell of suspicion.

Tunku: “You see, the Malays have a cause for adat, resam and so on ? tradition. I have a respect for it but he has none. He dislikes it. You see, his whole aim is to upset the constitution and turn this country into a republic. His son was in London talking quite openly amongst the students that his father is going to be the first President of Malaya.”

Das: “I head his daughter was also talking about it here ? Apparently she was caught talking about it at a party not knowing that behind her was one of the Tengkus from Negri Sembilan who overheard it. She said that as soon as the constitution amendment is signed, it is finished, we can become a republic.”

Against this background of suspicion, the 1983 constitutional crisis spilled out into the open, and the conflict grew even more intense.

In the next instalment of Ruling the Rulers, Wide Angle will look at the propaganda war and the resolution of the crisis. And, the other crises that lay in wait for Dr Mahathir and the Malay Rulers.

Huzir Sulaiman writes for theatre, film, television, and newspapers.

Ruling The Rulers - Part I

Sunday Star: April 6, 2008

Ruling the Rulers

In the first of a two-part series, Wide Angle columnist Huzir Sulaiman looks at the challenges faced by our Sultans throughout history.

IN 1779, the Dutch Governor of Malacca commissioned a study of Malay court ceremonies. The scribes took as their source a learned mosque official named Abdulmuhit who knew of the traditional ways of the Malacca Sultanate two centuries past. The resulting manuscript, the Adat Raja-Raja Melayu, mentions the ritualised insolence of the Prime Minister towards the Sultan.

According to the commentary of Prof Panuti Hudjiman of the University of Indonesia, when the Sultan summons the Bendahara, or royal Prime Minister, to attend a betrothal ceremony, “the Bendahara has a peculiar way of responding to this royal summons. When the messenger approaches him for the first time, he replies, ‘Datanglah kita mengadap’ (We will come).

“Instead of going straight away to the palace, the Bendahara takes a bath. Again a messenger is sent, only to be told by the Bendahara to return to the palace, as the Bendahara is coming. The Bendahara lets people wait for him: he gets dressed, and waits for a third summons before he obeys.?

“This is to show his position in relation to the king: the Bendahara is chief advisor to the king and is regarded as the power behind the throne. The use of the pluralis majestatis “kita” (the royal “we”) must be an assertion of superiority or arrogance.”

This is not just an isolated case being reported; the Bendahara repeats this ritualised show of arrogance when a new Sultan is crowned and the Bendahara is called back to serve, refusing to approach until the third summons.

We can see from the Adat Raja-Raja Melayu that the tensions between the Malay ruler and his powerful ministers were already encoded in the culture of Malay kingship at the time of its early flowering in the Malacca Sultanate – and I would argue that we are seeing echoes of it today in the recent standoff between Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong, who is also Sultan of Terengganu, and the Prime Minister.

It’s tempting to interpret the degree of interest shown by Their Highnesses the Sultans in the recent selection of Mentris Besar as a sudden flowering of royal activism, to be viewed with either glee or concern, depending on your attitude towards the Federal Government.

Seen from a historical perspective, however, this supposedly new royal intervention in the political arena is just the latest recurrence of the natural and understandable desire of the Malay ruler to actually do a bit of ruling once in a while – a desire that in the last 100 years has been continually constrained by the demands of British imperialists and Malay nationalists alike.

We should not be surprised that the Malay Rulers are making noise now; rather, we should be shocked that they have been quiet for so long. Much as they once had to deal with a ritually rude Bendahara, Their Highnesses have been obliged to accept as graciously as possible the interference of others.

In the colonial period, in the years before World War II, the Unfederated Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Johor had British Advisors who in the course of their “advising” attempted with varying degrees of success to govern indirectly.

From 1896, the Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang had British Residents imposed on them by treaty, and who governed quite directly, making proclamations and decrees that began with the famously offensive formula “The British Resident is pleased to?”.

The Japanese Occupation of Malaya saw some Sultans deposed by the new invaders, and others intimidated into cooperation. After the Japanese surrender, the British Military Administration presented itself to the Malay Rulers as the sole authority capable of recognising them as legitimate. If the Rulers were deemed to have collaborated with the Japanese or, more crucially, if they were not prepared to sign a new set of treaties turning over all their authority to Britain, they would be removed.

Brigadier H.C. Willan’s report on the Sultans on Oct 7, 1945, is a chilling example of the cynical exercise of power:

“In my view it would be wise to approach the Sultan of Johore first with regard to the negotiations for the new treaties. I think in his present state of mind he will sign. He is a realist and is fully aware that he is dependent on H.M.G.’s support ?

“(The Sultan of Selangor) is a pleasant person with not a very strong character and at present is so overjoyed at the return of the British and re-recognition of himself as Sultan, that in my view, he will sign the new treaty ?’’

“In my view the Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan should be approached next. In his present state of mind he is somewhat depressed and appears to me to be perplexed as to how his State can recover itself and would welcome directions rather than advice?.”

In the end, on pain of being deposed in favour of someone more accommodating, all nine Malay Rulers signed the MacMichael treaties, giving up virtually all their sovereign powers, except those relating to religion and Malay culture.

This first step towards Britain’s planned Malayan Union angered the burgeoning Malay nationalist movement, but scholars have pointed out that it was not so much the curtailment of the Malay Rulers’ powers that affronted Datuk Onn Jaafar and his comrades, as it was the British proposal that citizenship be granted to non-Malays born in Malaya.

It was the perceived threat to the powers of the Malay community, as opposed to the Malay Rulers, that truly galvanised the nationalists. (Indeed, Onn was arguably ambivalent about the Sultans, having in his younger days written newspaper articles critical of the Sultan of Johor.)

On March 30, 1946, the Malay Rulers were gathered in Kuala Lumpur to attend the installation of Sir Edward Gent, the new Governor. As Harry Miller tells it in his biography of Tunku Abdul Rahman, “That afternoon Onn personally conveyed to the Rulers a message from the United Malays National Organisation that it was the ‘desire of their people’ that they should not attend the Governor’s installation, and, indeed, they should ‘desist from taking part in any function connected with the Union.’

“The message went further: If the Rulers insisted on meeting the Governor they would be disowned by the people, who were determined to boycott the Malayan Union.”

Thousands of demonstrators gathered in front of the hotel where the Sultans were staying, shouting “Daulat Tuanku!” and “Hidup Melayu!”

As Miller puts it, “The Rulers walked down to the great crowded porch to receive the obeisance of the demonstrators. This was also a touching scene, although the more unyielding of the leaders in the U.M.N.O. said later, ‘We brought them down those stairs to teach them a lesson. They were lucky we did not destroy them completely for having signed the MacMichael treaties. As it was, we told them we would support them.’”

Caught between the “rock” of the British colonial authorities and the “hard place” of the angry Malay nationalists, the Malay Rulers complained to London that they were coerced into signing the MacMichael treaties, boycotted the Governor’s installation, and maintained a distance from him in public (while maintaining warm and cordial relations in private) until the British realised that the groundswell of opposition to the Malayan Union was too strong, and backed down.

The Federation of Malaya, the compromise constitutional scheme reached in 1948, saw Britain appointing Advisors who were truly advisory, with the states’ executive powers passing to the Mentris Besar.

Nonetheless, it appears clear that the Malay Rulers still feared that they would be emasculated by Umno, and Onn could not entirely reassure them.

As Sir Malcolm MacDonald wrote to Sir Henry Gurney on Dec 15, 1949, “In my talk with him on December 12th, Dato’ Onn told me of his recent talk with the Mentris Besar ? They asked him whether he proposed that the Rulers should be ousted in the near future. He replied emphatically in the negative. He said that probably in due course at least many of the Rulers would be abolished, because the Malays themselves would wish this. But that would not happen for a long time and depended on Malay public opinion.” (Emphasis mine.)

For Malaysians of my generation, who have grown up conditioned by the Sedition Act to not entertain the slightest republican thought, it is shocking to hear the founder of Umno coolly tell the Sultans’ ministers that he supposed Malays would one day wish for the abolition of their Rulers.

Six decades later, that day is still unthinkable.

But from the pre-Merdeka negotiations of the Alliance through to the events of the 1981-2003 era – when the metaphorical Bendahara was not so much ignoring the Sultan’s summons as trying to do the summoning – the Malay Rulers have had to stoically endure many more attempts to curtail their powers. I will examine this in my next column.

> Huzir Sulaiman writes for theatre, film, television, and newspapers.